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Abstract
Developers of applications relying on cryptographic libraries
can easily make mistakes in their use. Popular dynamic lan-
guages such as JavaScript make testing or verifying such ap-
plications particularly challenging. In this paper, we present
our ongoing work toward a methodology for automatically
checking security properties in JavaScript code. Our main
idea is to attach security annotations to values that encode
properties of interest. We illustrate our idea using examples
and, as an initial step in our line of work, we present a formal-
ization of security annotations in a statically typed lambda
calculus. As next steps, we will translate our annotations to
a dynamically typed formalization of JavaScript such as λJS
and implement a runtime checked type extension using code
instrumentation for full JavaScript.
CCS Concepts • Security and privacy → Software and
application security; • Software and its engineering →
Software verification and validation;
Keywords JavaScript, type systems
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1 Introduction
Increased public awareness of privacy concerns on the In-
ternet has led to software moving toward implementing
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strong cryptography by default, in a trend dubbed “ubiqui-
tous encryption”. For instance, web applications for messag-
ing platforms now routinely implement client-side cryptog-
raphy in JavaScript for true end-to-end encryption. Where
TLS/SSL terminates security at the HTTP server, application-
specific client-side cryptography can help secure modern
distributed environments consisting of cloud-hosted servers
and third-party content-distribution networks. Despite ini-
tial skepticism of browser-based cryptography [1, 16], a di-
verse range of cryptographic libraries and APIs for JavaScript
has evolved over the last ten years. To avoid the pitfalls of
purely JavaScript-based cryptography, the W3C has stan-
dardized the Web Cryptography API (WebCrypto), which is
implemented directly in the browser [24].
The clash between the agile mindset of JavaScript devel-
opers and the requirements of secure software engineering
leads to lingering problems: cryptographic APIs are often
hard to use correctly, and security problems do not lead to
failing test cases or visible errors. Even for a constant key, a
cursory inspection of the encrypted messages will not raise
suspicion. For example, the open source browser extension
Cryptocat for end-to-end encrypted messaging suffered from
critically weak security for over a year due to a subtle type
coercion bug in the use of private keys [22].
Despite several initiatives to verify not just cryptographic
protocols but reference implementations in software [2, 6],
it is not yet feasible to prove correctness of mainstream
implementations. Dynamic languages like JavaScript are no-
toriously difficult to formally reason about: the dynamic type
system and use of reflection thwart the application of expres-
sive type systems or theorem provers without significant
manual intervention by cryptographic experts [3, 14].
In this paper, we describe our work in progress toward a
new approach for checking the use of cryptographic APIs
in client code that is compatible with the dynamic type sys-
tem and common design patterns of JavaScript. Our goal
is to arrive at an automatic testing methodology that does
not require manual analysis by cryptographic experts. Our
main idea is to use a system of security annotations that is
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orthogonal to the existing type system. Security annotations
express security properties of values, e.g., whether a value
is a key of a certain length, or a cryptographically secure
random value. They are propagated alongside regular type
tags but follow their own semantics. Security annotations
should be transparent to client code until they encounter an
error, in which case the test program should fail.
We break down our research program into three phases:
(i) formalization of security annotations and validation of
our idea in a statically typed lambda calculus; (ii) adapta-
tion to the dynamic type system of a formal description of
JavaScript semantics such as λJS [11]; (iii) implementation
for full JavaScript using code instrumentation [19].
We motivate our work using examples of JavaScript code
that show how the full system of annotations—once imple-
mented—could help to detect bugs in cryptographic API us-
age (§2). Security type annotations are added to the signature
of an API function to specify required security properties on
arguments (preconditions) and ensure security properties
specified as annotation tags on return values or referenced
objects (postconditions). We formally define composable se-
curity annotations as a lattice model and provide its notion of
subtyping as well as the intricacies required to allow adding
or removing annotations (§3). We then present step (i) of
the research program outlined above, a formal definition
and prototype implementation of a statically typed lambda
calculus with security annotations (§4). We discuss the im-
plications of type safety in our lambda calculus and required
steps to continue our work (§5) before we compare to related
work (§6) and conclude (§7).
2 Introducing Security Annotations
We begin by illustrating our idea of security annotations
through two examples of security-critical JavaScript.
2.1 Example 1: Key Truncation
Listing 1 uses theWebCrypto API to create a random key and
encrypt a message, but a security bug in line 7 causes eight
bits of the key to be overwritten. To follow the control flow
of the example, note that it relies on promises, a mechanism
for asynchronous code execution heavily used inWebCrypto:
APImethods such as importKey immediately return a Promise
object, whose method then takes a function to be executed
once the operation is completed. The result of the operation
is passed to this function as an argument.
We introduce two security annotations to illustrate how
our approach would detect the bug at runtime: CryptKey de-
notes that a value is a valid key, and CSRV that a value is a
cryptographically secure random value. The importKey API
ensures that the resulting key has the CryptKey annotation
attached; getRandomValues ensures that it returns the array
passed as an argument with the CSRV annotation attached.
The encrypt API requires its key argument to be annotated
1 let c = crypto, cs = c.subtle;
2 let pt = new TextEncoder().encode("my message");
3 let iv = c.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
4 let alg = { name: "AES-GCM", iv: iv };
5 let rnd = c.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
6
7 if (...) { rnd[3] = 3; }
8 cs.importKey("raw", rnd, alg, false, ["encrypt"])
9 .then(function(key) {




Listing 1.A simple example ofWebCrypto usage in which
the security of the encryption is undermined.
with both CryptKey and CSRV (enforcing random session keys).
The pre- and postconditions can be checked during testing;
concretely, postconditions cause security annotations as ad-
ditional type tags; preconditions check whether required
annotations are present and throw an exception otherwise.
Security annotation tags are attached to values during exe-
cution. They are introduced and dropped through annotated
postconditions of API functions or the dynamic semantics
of operations. At runtime, the CSRV annotation is attached to
the Uint8Array object passed to getRandomValues. However,
the semantics for assignment will be defined such that mod-
ifying one of the array elements causes the array to lose the
CSRV annotation, as it is no longer a secure random value.
As a result the precondition check to fail upon entering the
encrypt function on line 10.
2.2 Example 2: Establishing a Session in Signal
The library libsignal-js is used by the JavaScript-based
desktop application for the Signal messaging platform. It
provides cryptographic functionality through frontends for
WebCrypto and primitives compiled from trusted C code
to JavaScript. We discuss through example how annotating
these primitives and the WebCrypto API can help test soft-
ware using libsignal-js for security property violations.
Listing 2 demonstrates the flexibility of placing precondi-
tion enforcement burdens on trusted API calls rather than
developer code. This function acts as a wrapper for a trusted
elliptic curve library—in principle, we would annotate each
API of this library in the same manner as proposed for
WebCrypto. This function takes as argument a private key,
asynchronously constructs a corresponding public key, and
returns the public-private key pairing. The function getRand-
omBytes acts as a wrapper for WebCrypto’s getRandomValues,
which we annotate in the same manner as §2.1. A central
advantage of our approach is that it allows to bypass the
inherent ad-hoc polymorphism of this function: annotating
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1 createKeyPair: function(privKey) {
2 if (privKey === undefined) {





Listing 2. The Internal.Curve.createKeyPair function in
src/Curve.js of libsignal-js.1
createKeyPair by hand, one would have to account for a
variable signature of the function leading to a complex and
unintuitive description. By annotating only trusted APIs, we
need not worry about about the polymorphism: instead of
checking preconditions at the boundaries of the developer’s
code, we simply check preconditions at each API call.
3 A Lattice of Security Annotations
This section details the usage of security annotations within
our approach. Annotations are declared locally in a library
such that they induce a lattice embedding a hierarchy only
on those annotations used by the library. We also introduce
useful operators for manipulating annotations.
Declaration and composition. Cryptographic APIs have
arguments and return values with several distinct security
properties. For example, recall WebCrypto’s encrypt API
from §2.1, which enforces two security properties on the key
argument, expressed via the annotations CSRV and CryptKey;
these annotations are distinct—some cryptographic keys are
not directly computed as random values (e.g., public keys).
Since distinct security annotations are required for different
trusted libraries, we propose that security annotations are
declared on a per library basis. Thus, program testing only
involves those annotations declared in the libraries used by
the program. The composition of two or more annotations is
expressed via the symmetric and associative operator ∗. For
example, a value annotated with CryptKey * CSRV has both
the CryptKey and CSRV security properties.
Hierarchies of annotations. Security properties have de-
grees of specificity, e.g., the property that a value is a crypto-
graphic key is less specific than that of a private key. Anno-
tations should thus not just be compositional but also have
natural subtyping-like structures. We further propose that
annotations may be declared as extensions of previously de-
clared annotations, indicating that an annotation is more
specific than any annotation it extends. For example, we
write SecAnn PrivKey extends CryptKey to say that PrivKey
1https://github.com/WhisperSystems/libsignal-protocol-javascript,
retrieved September 2017.
represents a more specific property than CryptKey. A collec-
tion of declarations induces a subannotation relation ≺:, i.e.,
the declaration above determines that PrivKey ≺: CryptKey.
The annotation lattice. We can naturally extend subanno-
tations to annotations composed by ∗ as well. Formally, this
is achieved by describing the extension of subannotations in
two rules, [S-Width] and [S-Depth] (see Figure 3), inspired
by record typing [15]. [S-Width] describes the intuition
that composing a number of annotations is more specific
than composing a subset of them. [S-Depth] encodes that
individual subannotation relationships also extend over com-
position. These judgments, together with those defined by
the extends declarations, induce a partial ordering of the
program annotations and in turn a lattice of security annota-
tions for each program under test. Top—the empty element—
intuitively represents a lack of valid security properties.
Operators on annotations We define two additional op-
erators of interest, the definitions of which are dependent on
the individual program’s annotation lattice. The first is the
natural least upper bound operator, ⊔, which finds the most
specific annotation in the lattice such that both operands
are a subannotation of it. The second operator is cut, which
is motivated by the idea that security properties should be
discarded when they are no longer valid. There is a subtlety
here: superannotations of a removed annotation should still
be valid when they are explicitly removed. For example the
result of cut(PrivKey*CSRV, PrivKey) is CryptKey * CSRV, the
most specific annotation such that PrivKey is no longer valid.
We define cut(S1, S2) formally as the unique annotation R
with S1 ≺: R and R ⊀: S2 such that if there is some other S
also satisfying these properties, then R ≺: S and S ⊀: R.
4 Formalizing Security Annotations
We present a minimal typed lambda calculus2 with security
annotations. We construct this small calculus to ensure the
correctness and feasibility of the approach; a discussion of
the translation of this formalization to dynamic languages
is contained in §5. The calculus adds security annotations,
which are defined for individual programs and manipulated
through specific keywords. We outline the syntax of this
calculus (§4.1), describe its dynamics (§4.2) and statics (§4.3),
and discuss specific notions of type safety (§4.4).
4.1 Syntax
The syntax for the lambda calculus is given in Figure 1, which
differs from that of a standard lambda calculus in several
ways. Firstly, values in this calculus comprise a prevalue,
corresponding to the values of a traditional lambda calcu-
lus, and a security annotation S . This allows us to represent
how security properties on individual values change over
2A prototype implementation in Haskell of our calculus is available at
https://github.com/ltbinsbe/lambda-security-tags.
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P ::= programs:
D . . .D [t]i annotations and program term
D ::= Annotation Declarations:
SecAnn a new annotation




λx : T<S>.t abstraction
t t application
if t then t else t conditional
let x = t in t let binding
t as S annotation introduction
t drop S annotation removal
w ::= prevalues:
λx : T<S>.t abstraction prevalue
true true prevalue
false false prevalue
v ::= annotated values:
w<S> annotated prevalue
S ::= security annotations:
a security annotation
S ∗ S annotation composition
Top empty annotation
T ::= pretypes:
Bool pretype of Booleans
A→ A pretype of functions




Γ,x : T<S> term variable binding
Figure 1. Syntax of the lambda calculus.
time. Annotations are modified via the as and drop keywords.
An as adds annotations, representing newly valid security
properties, while drop removes the annotations, representing
security properties that are no longer valid. Secondly, pro-
grams are prepended by a series of annotation declarations,
as described in §3, which define the annotations available in
the program together with the lattice they induce.
4.2 Dynamic Semantics
The evaluation rules, presented in Figure 2, follow those of a
standard lambda calculus [15], extended with the as and drop
constructs. As standard, [x 7→ v] t denotes the substitution
of the value v in place of the free occurrences of variable x
in term t . The rules for the if construct explicitly refer to
prevalues in order to decide which branch to take. The rules
for as and drop state that the result of evaluating t as S or
[E-App1]
t1 → t ′1
t1 t2 → t ′1 t2
[E-App2]
t2 → t ′2
t1 t2 → t1 t ′2
[E-AppAbs] (λx : T<S>.t )<S ′> v → [x 7→ v] t
[E-LetV] let x = v in t → [x 7→ v] t
[E-Let]
t1 → t ′1
let x = t1 in t2 → let x = t ′1 in t2
[E-IfTrue] if true<S> then t2 else t3 → t2
[E-IfFalse] if false<S> then t2 else t3 → t3
[E-If]
t1 → t ′1
if t1 then t2 else t3 → if t ′1 then t2 else t3
[E-AsV] w<S1> as S2 → w<S1 ∗ S2>
[E-DropV] w<S1> drop S2 → w<cut(S1, S2)>
[E-As]
t → t ′
t as S → t ′ as S [E-Drop]
t → t ′
t drop S → t ′ drop S
Figure 2. Dynamic semantics of the lambda calculus.
[S-Sub]
Γ ⊢ t : T<S1> S1 ≺: S2
Γ ⊢ t : T<S2>
[S-ArrowSub]
S2 ≺: S1 S3 ≺: S4 Γ ⊢ t : (T1<S1> → T2<S3>)<S>
Γ ⊢ t : (T1<S2> → T2<S4>)<S>
[S-Width] ∗n+ki=1 Si ≺: ∗ni=1Si
[S-Depth]
for each i, S ′i ≺: Si
∗ni=1S ′i ≺: ∗ni=1Si
Figure 3. Hierarchical security annotation judgments.
t drop S is the result of evaluating t with possibly updated
annotations. In the case of as, new security properties are
added (or existing ones strengthened) by composing the
original annotationwith S ; for drop, annotations are removed
by cutting S from the original annotation (see §3).
4.3 Static Semantics
Figures 3 and 4 present inference rules defining the static
type system. We describe first rules relating to subannota-
tions and then discuss other rules of particular interest.
Judgments for hierarchical security annotations. Recall-
ing the discussion in §3, we embed this lattice of annotations
into the type system. The first two rules of Figure 3 are stan-
dard subsumption rules enriched with annotations; they en-
sure that a term will type-check as any subannotation of the
one attached: if a term is valid for many security properties,
then it must still be valid for each individually. The lattice is
encoded by the [S-Width] and [S-Depth], described in §3.
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[T-Var]
x : T<S> ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ x : T<S>
[T-True] true<S> : Bool<S> [T-False] false<S> : Bool<S>
[T-Abs]
Γ,x : T1<S1> ⊢ t : T2<S2>
Γ ⊢ (λx : T1<S1>.t )<S3> : (T1<S1> → T2<S2>)<S3>
[T-App]
Γ ⊢ t1 : (T1<S1> → T2<S2>)<S3> Γ ⊢ t2 : T1<S1>
Γ ⊢ t1 t2 : T2<S2>
[T-Let]
Γ ⊢ t1 : T1<S1> Γ,x : T1<S1> ⊢ t : T2<S2>
Γ ⊢ let x = t1 in t2 : T2<S2>
[T-If]
Γ ⊢ t1 : Bool<> Γ ⊢ t2 : T2<S2> Γ ⊢ t3 : T3<S3>
Γ ⊢ if t1 then t2 elset3 : T2<S2 ⊔ S3>
[T-As]
Γ ⊢ t : T<S1>
Γ ⊢ t as S2 : T<S1 ∗ S2>
[T-Drop]
Γ ⊢ t : T<S1>
Γ ⊢ t drop S2 : T<cut(S1, S2)>
Figure 4. Typing judgments for the lambda calculus.
1 SecAnn A
2 SecAnn B
3 SecAnn C extends A
4 SecAnn D extends C
5
6 if true<> then true<D*B> else false<A*B>
Listing 3. Typing the if construct.
The if statement. In typing the if construct we want to
retain the maximal amount of information possible without
over-complicating our annotation lattice (e.g., via sum-like
annotations). It is intuitive to consider the most expressive
annotation valid along both branches (i.e. the ⊔ operator);
consider the trivial example in Listing 3. Since both C and D
are not valid along the else branch, they cannot be suban-
notations of the resulting annotation. We therefore type this
as Bool<A*B> = Bool<D*B ⊔ A*B>. The type after evaluating
the program will be a subtype of this; this consequence of
allowing a more expressive construct is discussed in §5.
Adding and removing security annotations. The typing
rules for as and drop reflect that t as S and t drop S evalu-
ate to the same prevalue as t with (possibly) modified annota-
tions. The modified annotation corresponds to the prevalue’s
annotation at runtime, as determined by ∗ and cut.
4.4 Annotated Type Safety
The classical notion of type safety within this calculus merits
discussion: type safety in this calculus is important to ensure
that the flexible system of annotations introduced does not
result in the ability of invalid programs to pass type checks.
We formulate a notion of type safety based on the traditional
notions of (i) progress and (ii) preservation [15], which we
adapt to incorporate security annotations:
(i) A well-typed term is either a value, or can take a step
of evaluation according to the rules in Figure 2.
(ii) If a well-typed term takes a step of evaluation, then
the resulting term is also well-typed, i.e. if t : T<S> and
t → t ′, then there is some S ′ ≺: S such that t ′ : T<S ′>.
Here, a term t is well-typed if there is some type T and secu-
rity annotation S such that t : T<S>. A proof of these twin
statements is straightforward and is therefore omitted. The
differing notion of (ii) reflects our if construct, however
we are unconcerned by this: programs cannot type as valid
when they do not possess the necessary security properties.
5 Discussion
We discuss the lambda calculus and the formalization of secu-
rity annotations in full dynamic languages, e.g., JavaScript.
On annotated type safety. Since security annotations can
be arbitrarily modified inline by the programmer, it is pos-
sible to circumvent the notion of type safety by assigning
annotations to terms to arbitrarily pass any type check; the
developer would simply lose the benefits of using security
annotations to enforce correct preconditions of secure APIs.
Dynamic enforcement of annotations. We intend this no-
tion of annotations as a first step toward dynamic enforce-
ment of security properties in JavaScript: we have constructed
a kernel representation of this within a formal setting and
demonstrated the guarantees which accompany this pre-
sentation. The transition to dynamic checking of security
annotations within the calculus presented in §4 is straightfor-
ward: values comprise prevalues and annotations, so we can
directly alter the evaluation rules to introduce enforcement
mechanisms, i.e., the [E-AppAbs] rule would become
[E-AppAbs’]
v = w<S1> S1 ≺: S2
(λx : T<S2>.t )<S3> v → [x 7→ v] t
.
This dynamically ensures the annotation is valid; a second
evaluation rule would throw a security exception in the event
that S1 ⊀: S2. This is the first step; next, we plan to translate
this model into an existing formal semantics for JavaScript,
such as λJS [11].
Annotation-polymorphic functions. There is one further
challenge within the central concept of checking security
properties via attaching annotations as postconditions to
functions. Namely, many functions will have distinct valid
postconditions dependent on the security properties of the
supplied value. For example, consider the JavaScript func-
tion window.btoa which takes a string and returns a Base64
encoded string. Clearly, any security properties valid on the
argument should be still valid on the return value. Therefore,
if the annotation passed to the function is S , we would expect
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1 SecAnn Encoding
2 SecAnn Base64 extends Encoding
3
4 (let myBtoa = λ x : String<S>.
5 (((cpAnn x (window.btoa x)) drop Encoding) as
Base64)
6 in myBtoa "SecretKey"<S>
Listing 4. Enforcing the security properties of btoa.
the annotation of the returned value to be cut(S, encoding) ∗
Base64. In a purely static setting, annotation variables would
be required to achieve this typing. However, in the dynamic
setting we can introduce an operator cpAnn which copies the
annotations from one term to another, e.g., via
[E-cpAnnV]
v1 = w1<S1> v2 = w2<S2>
cpAnnv1 v2 → w2<S1 ∗ S2>
.
Intuitively, this suffices in the dynamic setting: functions at
most destroy every annotation on entry, or they manipulate
the annotations present on a value by adding some fixed
annotations or removing fixed annotations, representing the
security properties of the function. This allows the propa-
gation of security annotations through our dynamic system.
As a simple example of this construct, we consider a wrapper
myBtoa around a library function window.btoa in a language
much like the one described in §4 with strings. In order to
describe the security properties of such a function, we con-
sider the example function in Listing 4. Here, the program
will evaluate to a value with the desired annotation.
6 Related Work
Type systems for security property enforcement have been
advocated by Bhargavan et al. [2, 5, 6, 9]. The dependently
typed languages F7 and F* [20] seek to statically verify se-
curity properties in F# code. Security type systems [17] aug-
ment types with annotations specifying policies for secure
information flow. Our approach is similar to this, but heavily
relies on annotations changing over time, which in secu-
rity type systems only occurs during declassification. Type
qualifiers [8] are another related concept. They provide an
extension of the type system via composable qualifiers that
represent properties of the program terms; however, type
qualifiers are ill-suited to untyped scripting languages [12].
Work extending the expressiveness of JavaScript’s type
system often builds distinct dialects [7, 23]. Such approaches,
including industry tools Flow or TypeScript, allow for over-
approximate static checking of programs that are written
specifically in these dialects. TreatJS [13] is a higher-order
design-by-contract system for run-time checking code con-
tracts with native JavaScript: however, properties such as
valid key generation cannot be encoded as native assertions
without further instrumentation.
The work of Taly et al. [21] describes an automated anal-
ysis for security-critical JavaScript APIs that complements
ours. We assume that the APIs themselves are secure but
construct a mechanism to ensure correct API usage. Pro-
Script [3, 14] is a domain-specific language for cryptographic
protocols that builds on Defensive JavaScript [4] to allow
developers and cryptography experts to work together to in-
corporate verified protocol implementations into JavaScript
applications.We propose amethodology enabling developers
to gain feedback on their implementation without requiring
help by cryptography experts.
Recent work has demonstrated the tractability of logic-
based symbolic verification techniques for JavaScript [18],
building upon previous work [10] toward the semi-automatic
verification of JavaScript programs. To verify individual pro-
grams, one must write precise logical specifications for each
function: this can provide strong guarantees at the cost of
requiring significant manual intervention by developers.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have presented the first step toward a new
approach for the checking of cryptographic libraries usage
within JavaScript. Our methodology places at a premium the
need for any solution to be usable by non-expert develop-
ers. The annotation of trusted cryptographic libraries with
pre- and postconditions in the form of security annotations
promises to enable fully automatic testing for violations of
the assumptions upon which security proofs rely.
We described the first stage of our research program by
validating the concept within a statically typed lambda cal-
culus, and presented a formal model of composable security
annotations. We discussed the challenges for the next step of
this approach in transforming our current construction to the
dynamic setting, describing additional constructs required
to handle real-world JavaScript code.
We aim to continue the research program by adapting our
formalization to the dynamic setting using existing formal-
izations of JavaScript semantics such as λJS [11]. Finally, we
will implement security annotations as a language extension
to JavaScript using source code instrumentation. This allows
to check API usage in a manner transparent to the code un-
der test. Finally, we aim to develop a thorough set of pre-
and postconditions for widespread cryptographic libraries,
in particular the WebCrypto API.
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